As generative AI rapidly expands and discourse surrounding an “AI Basic Society” and the ambition to become one of the world’s “Top3 AI Powers” intensifies, calls are growing in South Korea for technology to be understood from more multidimensional perspectives. Artificial intelligence is no longer simply a tool for industrial development. Its growing influence on democracy, human rights, and everyday life has made it a central social and political issue, while AI governance is emerging as a key public concern. Yet amid the government-led push for AI policies centered on speed and competitiveness, an important question remains, Are the voices of citizens and laborers being meaningfully reflected?
Grounded in the history of Korea’s information rights movement, the Institute for Digital Rights (IDR) turns its attention to the contemporary crises of AI governance and democracy. In this interview, we spoke with Yeo-kyeong Chang, Executive Director of the institute, about the evolution of Korea’s information rights movement, the demands civil society is raising from the perspective of digital justice in the age of artificial intelligence, and its perspective on the governance shaping AI policymaking.
The Era of State Surveillance That Began with a Floppy Disk
Q. There are still few organizations in South Korea working on digital justice and information rights. At a time when “AI Basic Society” discourse is gaining momentum, the role of the Institute for Digital Rights seems increasingly important. Could you briefly introduce why the institute was founded and the work it focuses on today?
The emergence of Korea’s information rights movement is deeply connected to the country’s democratization process. Under authoritarian governments marked by extensive state surveillance, the IT systems that began to spread in the 1990s were also utilized by the government as instruments of state power.
In 1990, Private Seok-yang Yoon of the Defense Security Command exposed the military’s surveillance of civilians by revealing files stored on floppy disks. The public was deeply shocked to learn that digital technologies were already being used for civilian surveillance. The case led to Korea’s first lawsuit asserting the right to personal information privacy. It was the first legal action to seek damages against the state for using personal data in surveillance and monitoring, even in the absence of physical intrusion or bodily harm.
In 1998, the Supreme Court formally recognized citizens’ rights over their personal information. From that point on, the impact of technological development on privacy and democracy became a growing social issue in South Korea.
In response, a group of young activists came together in the 1990s with two goals in mind. One was to expand the use of IT technologies to strengthen international exchange and solidarity within Korean civil society. The other was to build critical oversight of how these technologies were being used.
To pursue these goals, activists established a permanent organization focused on technology and personal data issues. The Korean Progressive Network Center, founded in 1998. The organization provided network services for civil society groups while also advocating for the introduction of rights-based approaches to digital technology policy, including the protection of privacy and data rights. These efforts contributed to major institutional developments, including the Declaration of the Right to Self-Determination Regarding Personal Information in 2005 and the enactment of the Personal Information Protection Act in 2011.
At the same time, many activists came to feel that fragmented, agenda-driven campaigns were no longer sufficient to keep pace with the increasingly specialized and rapidly expanding field of national digital policy. In response, the Institute for Digital Rights (IDR) was established in 2015 with support from the Korean Progressive Network Center and other civil society actors. Today, the institute focuses primarily on research, policy development, and public education through lectures and training programs.
Fast Tracked AI Legislation and Civil Society’s Belated Concerns
Q. I heard that a civil society coalition was formed in late March to respond to AI policy developments. What led to its formation?
Today, many civil society groups concerned about the impact of artificial intelligence on information rights are calling for human rights–based principles and public education around AI. As part of these efforts, the Institute for Digital Rights has introduced the concept of a “human rights–based approach” to artificial intelligence and engaged in solidarity work around information rights violations emerging across different sectors.
For example, there has been a growing number of cases in which AI amplifies existing social problems, such as the expansion of gender-based violence through deepfake technology. As these issues became more widespread, inquiries about how to respond to them also increased across multiple sectors.
At the same time, civil society faced growing uncertainty over how to respond to AI-related issues, while witnessing the rapid development and expansion of AI led by industry, governments, and global institutions. This produced a growing sense of urgency. In response, civil society organizations came together to launch the “Civil Society Joint Action for Strengthening AI Accountability and Publicness” (AI Civil Action), with the aim of collectively developing strategies and responses. The coalition brings together organizations from a wide range of sectors, including environmental groups, women’s organizations, and digital rights movements.
Q. What has been the AI Civil Action’s main focus?
AI Civil Action is currently focused most heavily on South Korea’s AI Basic Act. Like the EU, South Korea has moved forward with AI legislation, which came into effect on January 22, 2026. However, the law-making process, led by the Ministry of Science and ICT, not only excluded civil society participation but also resulted in significant shortcomings from the perspectives of human rights and safety. Above all, the law remains heavily centered on supporting the AI industry.
Although the legislation includes provisions requiring assessments of AI’s impact on basic human rights, the views of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea were not reflected in the process at all. There was no consultation with the commission. Instead, assessments concerning the impact on basic human rights are being reviewed internally and non-transparently by the Ministry of Science and ICT and its affiliated public agencies alone.
A major concern related to this is the broader governance structure surrounding AI policy. The legislative process behind the Special Act on Data Centers illustrates the problem clearly. Despite the significant environmental impact of data center construction and its effects on local communities, the bill was passed after discussion only within the National Assembly’s Science, ICT, Broadcasting and Communications Committee, without consultation with committees responsible for the environment.
As a result, AI Civil Action only became aware of the bill after it had already passed the committee stage. Civil society groups hurriedly submitted their opinions to the National Assembly, but by then the subcommittee review had already concluded. Within just a few days, the bill was passed in the plenary session, effectively ending the legislative process.
Throughout this fast-tracked process, even the views of environment-related committees within the National Assembly were left out. The process exposed serious problems in the governance structure surrounding AI policy.
AI Policy Should Be Social Policy, Not Just Industrial Policy
Q. As the government and industry continue to dominate AI discourse through the lens of efficiency and economic growth, there is growing concern that the critical and watchdog role of civil society may instead be framed as an obstacle to progress.
South Korea aims to become one of the world’s top 3 AI powers by boosting its national AI competitiveness. In response, civil society’s core argument is simple. AI policy should be treated as social policy, not just industrial policy.
Earlier this year, the government released the “Korea AI Action Plan.” One proposal frames AI-based care systems as a solution to South Korea’s low birth rate, aging population, and eldercare crisis. For instance, the elderly receiving in-home care often move into nursing facilities once in-home care is no longer possible. Because nursing facilities require more public spending, the government is looking for ways to extend home care services. The plan proposes distributing AI care robots to households while also growing the robotics industry. But a key question is missing. Does this actually improve care for the people? Is this the right direction for public care policy? These questions were largely left off the table because social policy ministries, including the Ministry of Health and Welfare, had little say in the process. The issue was approached mainly as an industrial policy issue tied to the robotics sector.
The structure of the government’s AI Strategy Committee reflects the same problem. Groups representing citizens and workers were very limited, and roughly 80 percent of the committee members were men. Social policy agencies such as the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and the Fair Trade Commission were also largely left out. In practice, the National AI Strategy Committee is run almost entirely by the Ministry of Science and ICT, a ministry focused on technology and industry.
Under this structure, it is difficult for AI policy to function as social policy. That is why we argue that the governance behind AI policymaking needs to change. Otherwise, AI policy will continue to prioritize industrial growth while social policy concerns remain sidelined.
Democracy Must Not Be Overlooked in the Name of Speed
Q. From what you describe, it is deeply concerning that these policies are being pushed forward so quickly without democratic discussion or meaningful participation from workers, organizations, and the people directly affected in places where AI technologies are being implemented.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare submitted its opinions on the AI Action Plan, just as the Ministry of Environment submitted opinions during the passage of the Special Act on Data Centers. But the problem is structural. Because leadership over AI policy is concentrated in industry-focused ministries, consultation often amounts to little more than a formality.
While we have pointed out the exclusion of social policy ministries from AI governance, the exclusion of civil society is just as serious. Civil society matters because it represents the interests of citizens and workers who are directly affected by technologies.
The same issue appeared in AI labor policy. Labor unions were not included in discussions. Earlier this year, Hyundai Motor Group announced plans to introduce Atlas humanoid robots into manufacturing sites. When Hyundai workers began voicing concerns, the president Lee publicly criticized the labor union, which became a national news issue.
There is a growing assumption that involving civil society slows down industrial development and weakens competitiveness. We believe this accelerationist mindset is itself a serious problem.
Q. The growth of South Korea’s stock market has become one of the country’s biggest political priorities. The expansion of the AI and semiconductor industries is being strongly justified in the name of national competitiveness and market growth. How do you assess this trend?
I think this goes beyond the KOSPI itself. South Korean society is also being shaped by broader global shifts in values and political priorities. Global political and economic trends now affect South Korea almost in real time. Policy directions and democratic backsliding in other countries also influence Korea. That is why Korean civil society must work even harder to advance democracy.
In many ways, the current government’s approach to AI policy resembles a more polished version of South Korea’s economic development model from the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, Korea pursued rapid economic growth by importing advanced technologies from industrialized countries and positioning itself as a subcontractor within the global industrial system, with human rights paying the price.
One of the key lessons South Korea learned through democratization was the importance of social dialogue and corporate responsibility for human rights. Today, however, these values are increasingly being pushed aside. This is one of the central challenges facing civil society today.
To be continued in Part 2