South Korea’s presidential election on 3 June 2025 took place amid intense political upheaval and institutional crisis. Widespread public discontent over corruption scandals, executive-judiciary tensions, and democratic backsliding had dominated the pre-election atmosphere. The victory of Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung sends a strong signal about the public’s expectations for reform, stability, and credible leadership, in a context of rising regional and global tensions, challenges to multilateralism, and growing pressure on liberal democracies. We asked 3 questions to Kristian Brakel, Director of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung’s East Asia | Global Dialogue office in Seoul.
1. South Korea’s general election sent a strong message from voters. What are your key takeaways from the results, particularly in light of the recent political crisis and erosion of institutional trust?
After the last turbulent half year, following conservative President Yoon's attempt to overthrow the constitution, voters opted first and foremost for stability and a clear upholding of the democratic order.
While now elected Lee Jae-Myung (49.42%) has been viewed as a leftist fire-brand (at least for Korean standards) for some time, he has moderated many of his views in recent months, trying to vow centrist and conservative voters. A strategy the success of which seems to be unclear. The fact that the conservative candidate, who until the end did not disavow Yoon, nor his self-coup attempt still could muster 41.15% support speaks to the polarisation of the country, which has only deepened after the coup. Lee did however manage to draw people to the polls, receiving the highest number of votes in South Korean democratic history. A clear show, that voters saw the unprecedented democratic crisis their country is in. The main concern for many voters however will still be the economy. South Korea, the economic powerhouse of recent decades had already been under stress, with growth rates declining, but the threat of imminent US sanctions has driven the export oriented economy into crisis.
There is another major takeaway: the global gender split in voter behaviour as seen in the US and Germany had already been a factor in the last elections and it is continuing. Especially among people in their twenties, young women were double as likely to vote for the liberal candidate. While young men flocked strongest to a third candidate farthest on the right, who ran on a partly anti-gender equality platform. He did however also represent the clearest cut with the political establishment, that many young voters view as hopelessly outdated.
2. How do you expect the new government to approach foreign and security policy, especially in light of North Korea’s military threats?
It is established traditions for presidents in Korea to make an 180 degree flip in foreign policy when they come to power. Much of the ideological divide in the country finds its fiercest battleground over foreign policy issues: the relationship with the former colonial power Japan, how to deal with China, peace talks or military deterrence vis a vis North Korea and how independent the country's security should be of the US. Lee who had a strong emphasis on established policies of the Democratic Party (DP) in all these points (anti-Japan, independence from US, peace with North Korea, do not anger China) has used the election campaign to moderate many of these views.
While many older DP voters and party cadres stick to these traditional talking points, even a liberal president is aware that the geo-political situation has changed. With the American alliance not being as steadfast under Trump as it used to be, and younger voters not placing any importance on reunification with North Korea any more, the foreign policy disruption this time around might not be as stark as in recent years. Korea, as Germany, is together with Japan the one country in Asia that is fully dependent on US security guarantees, especially in the Nuclear realm.
Due to the power vacuum in Seoul in recent months, other than Japan, Seoul has so far been mostly sidelined by the Trump-administration, while at the same time plans to re-focus US troops in Korea on deterring China rather than Pyongyang have surfaced, causing quite some concern. In his inauguration speech Lee vowed to continue both strong cooperation with the US (he hardly has a choice), but also military deterrence against the North (which is new). While he said, that he would stretch out his hand to North Korea for a more peaceful cooperation, chances for that are slim.The trilateral cooperation with Japan, which was started under Biden and is part and parcel of US anti-China deterrence is something that is unpopular at home, but on the other hand something Lee in his campaign has hinted on, that it will continue. Not so clear however is how he will deal with China and Russia. These topics were ominously absent in his speech. Among his foreign policy team are those who argue that Korea should take an ambiguous middle-men position.
What also would be worth continuing from his predecessor's legacy would be building stronger and more concrete alliances with South East Asia.
3. The EU and South Korea share strong trade ties and a commitment to democratic values. How might South Korea strengthen its strategic partnerships with European countries and the EU, particularly as transatlantic dynamics shift and the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly central to global politics?
Both the EU and South Korea in recent years have come to rely on each other more strongly. South Korea, as Japan, are often touted as value partners and part of parcel of a more active EU strategy in the Pacific. The problem with that approach is that South Korea has indeed the potential, but currently lacks both the institutional set-up and partly the political will to become a much more active player. For Europe the problem is, that its approach in the region has been largely modelled by the US pivot to Asia. However with the alliance with the US weakening, it is a bit unclear, both what strategic aims Europe still maintains for itself (apart from open trade routes) and absent a strong military presence which resources it could and would potentially dispatch to a potential conflict in the Pacific. So while both South Korea and Europe might have realised that a stronger alliance would make sense, many of the detailed questions remain unanswered. This is especially true regarding what eroding US security guarantees mean for those two world regions where they matter most in terms of nuclear armament, the risks of an arms race and independent strategic thinking (without DC that is).
Part of these discussions also needs to be the fact that the foreign policy model, that made South Korea so successful might have come to its natural end: China is the number one export market for the mercantile South Korea, and much like Germany, its foreign policy has traditionally been focused on: lets sell things first, ask about human rights later. Russia on the other hand is still a main source of Uranium for the country that produces 17% of its energy from nuclear. Korea has therefore been reluctant to too strongly support Ukraine through its fledgling arms industry, although some weapons and ammunition have been supplied through 3rd country deals. The fact that North Korea is now in an active cooperation with Russia has both meant that Koreans were more impacted by what happens in the European theatre and also more careful, to poke Moscow.
All in all, South Korea, a peninsula that for many decades has lived in some kind of (more or less splendid foreign policy) isolation, mostly looking after its own affairs with the belligerent neighbour to the north, needs to learn that opening up and showing a greater interest in the world out there and global affairs in general is something that cannot be avoided under a growing multi-polar order. Doing so however is not super popular at home.
Watch the recording of the 4 June webinar "Elections in South Korea: Geopolitical dynamics and domestic course-setting".
This article first appeared here: eu.boell.org