The discourse surrounding artificial intelligence inevitably raises fundamental questions of human rights and democracy: whose lives are affected, in what ways, and who is allowed to participate in the policy decisions responding to those impacts. This perspective lies at the core of the concerns raised by Yeo-kyeong Chang, who argues that AI policy operating within broader structures of labor, care, welfare, public safety, climate, and social power should be understood not merely as a matter of industrial policy, but first and foremost as a matter of social policy tied to citizens’ rights and social justice.
The digital justice movement within civil society is currently navigating the tension between technological efficiency and critical democratic principles. In many ways, it remains in the process of developing through ongoing social debate and public deliberation. Over time, the impacts of AI will become increasingly visible and concrete within the everyday lives of citizens. In that process, what will be required is neither technological optimism nor fear-driven panic, but the creation of democratic and participatory structures through which citizens themselves can meaningfully intervene in and shape the direction of technological development.
The “Dual Challenge” Facing Civil Society in the Age of AI
Q. Listening to your explanation, I become more aware of the seriousness of the current situation. At the same time, within civil society, there also seems to be a growing demand not only to criticize and monitor AI, but also to actively utilize it in advocacy, education, and organizational operations. Yet concerns about technological dependence and uncritical adoption continue to coexist alongside these expectations. When you meet activists and civil society organizations in the field, to what extent do you think civil society is using AI in a balanced and critical way?
This is truly one of the central dilemmas facing civil society today. We often receive two seemingly contradictory questions at the same time from different organizations and individuals within civil society. Many ask how generative AI can be effectively utilized. On the other hand, many are concerned about how to respond to AI’s impact on employment and labor. Women’s organizations, for example, are deeply concerned about how AI is amplifying deepfakes and gender-based violence, while at the same time exploring how AI tools might improve the efficiency and accessibility of counseling services for survivors of violence.
What matters, ultimately, is maintaining a balance between adoption and critique. As digital systems spread, it became possible to record and accumulate detailed information about every aspect of people’s lives. In other words, surveillance power increased significantly. At the same time, however, digital networks also expanded the capacities and organizational power of citizens. Civil society has therefore evolved by continuously negotiating between these two competing dynamics, at times in tension, and at times in search of balance and coexistence. It was within this context that the concept of ‘informational self-determination’ emerged. The ability of individuals to make decisions regarding their own data and technological environment is one of the central principles of digital rights.
For that reason, I believe there is a certain form of technological determinism both in forcing people to accept technologies uncritically and in demanding their outright rejection. What we emphasize instead is that civil society should engage with these technologies in a more participatory and interventionist way. From that perspective, we have also produced and distributed publications such as ‘generative AI guidelines’ for civil society activists.
Q. Listening to your perspective, it seems that civil society organizations and human rights activists are facing a kind of “dual challenge” in the age of AI. On the one hand, they must critically monitor how technologies and platforms are being used by capital and state power. On the other hand, there also appears to be growing pressure stemming from the concern that, unless civil society itself is able to sufficiently understand and utilize these technologies, it may fall behind in shaping public discourse and maintaining social influence.
The former UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, once criticized Big Tech companies in a report examining the use of AI in social welfare systems. He argued that major technology corporations were operating in what he described as an “almost human rights-free zone.” In other words, his critique was that technological development and deployment were advancing at high speed while public institutions and regulatory systems remained largely incapable of exercising meaningful democratic oversight or human rights protections.
Public awareness of the human rights implications of Big Tech platforms operating in what was effectively a regulatory vacuum has emerged only relatively recently. The seriousness of these issues became more widely recognized after revelations that social media user data had been utilized in several electoral processes, exposing the extent to which digital platforms could influence political power and democratic systems. Yet even now, adequate legal tools for responding to such problems remain largely insufficient. It was only after scandals involving election interference that data protection authorities began to intervene more actively and aspects of Facebook’s advertising systems and internal mechanisms gradually came to light. In many respects, however, these responses arrived too late.
Given how difficult it remains for civil society to respond effectively to both the usefulness and the risks of AI technologies, I believe the role of independent researchers and investigative journalism is critically important. Civil society organizations often focus on developing normative frameworks and policy proposals, but uncovering the actual realities of platform power and technological harms frequently depends on researchers and investigative reporters.
However, the conditions for such work are increasingly difficult. Media organizations themselves have already become deeply dependent on platform-centered digital ecosystems. News outlets that should be monitoring technological power and exposing structural problems are simultaneously forced to compete within platform economies for advertising visibility and algorithmic distribution. As a result, they are pushed into speed-driven production cycles that prioritize rapidly generating platform-compatible content.
Researchers face similar structural obstacles. Accessing information from outside Big Tech platforms is extremely difficult, and research funding overwhelmingly favors industrial promotion and technological development over critical inquiry into social harms and rights protections. Even within Korean academic databases, there are far more studies arguing that personal data protection laws hinder corporate innovation and economic activity than there are critical studies focused on protecting the rights of ordinary citizens. Research grounded in the perspective of public rights and democratic accountability remains remarkably scarce.
Ultimately, the issue today goes beyond concerns about the risks of specific technologies. The deeper problem is that technological power has grown outside the boundaries of democratic oversight and human rights norms. Although civil society groups and researchers continue to raise warnings with difficulty, the current environment clearly limits their ability to effectively monitor and challenge the immense power of major platforms. What is needed now is not simply to keep pace with the speed of technological development, but to build a new form of democratic governance that can publicly examine the social impacts of technology and place citizens’ rights at its center.